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5 June 1958

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### CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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
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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	5 June 1958	
25X1	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
L	USSR-France: Moscow's caution regarding the	
	French situation appears to be based on a desire to keep	
no ·	the way open for a deal with De Gaulle should the oppor-	
	tunity arise. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov	
,	indicated to the American and French ambassadors in	
	Moscow that the USSR was perplexed about developments	
	in France and about what line Soviet policy should take.	
	First Deputy Premier Mikoyan told the West German am-	
	bassador that the Soviet Union was not concerned about	
	De Gaulle's coming to power because his eventual failure	
	would pave the way for the Communists.	
	II. ASIA-AFRICA	
	Lebanon: Government forces have moved to counter	
	new rebel activity in the Biqa Valley area and in Tripoli,	
	and further military action is expected. Syria	
	determined to keep the fight-	
	ing going pressing hard to send reinforce-	
	ments into Lebanon, with or without the consent of Lebanese	
	Indonesia: The Indonesia: Mathematica (mark)	
	Indonesia: The Indonesian National party (PNI), the	
	largest non-Communist group in Java with the largest representation in the cabinet, within the last week openly attacked	
	the Communist party (PKI) for the first time. A PNI state-	
	ment of 27 May denounced the Communists' overt domestic	
	or = . May denounced the Confidentials Over domestic	
	i	

	French role in military planning and his probable intention	
	to speed up France's attainment of an independent nuclear weapons capability.	1
		_
ho	*De Gaulle's position on Algeria: De Gaulle's 4 June promise of political equality to Algerian Moslems, a logical	
700	extension of the public professions of the Algiers civilian	
	and military junta, actually runs counter to the increasingly	
	apparent opposition of the extremists to any real change in the status quo in Algeria.	$\neg$
	De Gaulle's long-range plans for Algeria involve some form	
	of autonomy and federation with France, a policy which is anathema to extremists, and it is unlikely that he intended	
	this address as a final policy guide. De Gaulle's promise,	
	if accompanied by an honest implementation of franchise	
	laws, might induce the uncommitted majority of the 9,000,-000 Moslems to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward	
	France, but is not likely to find support among Moslem ex-	
	tremists. The FLN rebel leadership, which considers his speech 'no basis whatsoever for a reconciliation,' will con-	
	tinue to fight for recognition of Algeria's right to independ-	
	ence. Morocco and Tunisia will probably adopt a cautious	
	if not distrustful, attitude toward De Gaulle's proposal.	
	Italya Basent indication and the Day of the Control	
	Italy: Recent indications are that the Democratic Socialists intend to reject any Christian Democratic overtures	
yes	to join a coalition, pending clarification of the prospects of	
	Socialist reunification. Such a refusal would appear to assur continuation of a minority - all - Christian Democratic gov-	·e
	ernment, since the other allies of the former center coali-	
	tion cannot form a majority by themselves. (Page 6)	



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#### THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

#### Crisis in Lebanon

Government security forces have moved to counter new rebel activity in the Tripoli area, and rebel attacks on the city are expected. Sporadic clashes continue in the Biga **Valley**[ 25X1 Beirut, approximately 12 bombs exploded during the night of 3-4 June. The following day, more bombs were set off, and Lebanese Army troops fought a three-hour battle with insurgents in the city's main Moslem quarter. The increased bombings by rebel extremists probably reflect an attempt to promote instability and to maintain the momentum of the rebellion pending new opposition moves 25X1 25X1 While the military situation remains essentially in a stalemate, Syria 25X1 striving to maintain the momentum of the reballion 25X1 notess, large and well-armed antigovernment groups remain in northern and southern Lebanon and in the Bigs Valley 25X1 25X1 5 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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Despite possible Arab League and UN Security Council efforts to settle the crisis in Lebanon, the build-up of UARsupported rebel forces suggests that the opposition, or at least the UAR, wants a solution of the crisis by force rather than by political compromise. A Cairo radiobroadcast on 3 June quoted Lebanese opposition leader Jumblatt to the effect that the antigovernment forces sought "a united command, coordination of action, and a permanent revolution council, because these will expedite the end of the crisis in Lebanon." Although the words may not be Jumblatt's, they suggest that Cairo seeks to sustain and control the rebellion until its political objective of removing Chamoun from power is accomplished. The American Embassy in Beirut also reports that the opposition is becoming more articulate in advocating elections to install a new pro-UAR parliament which would choose Chamoun's successor.

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
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#### Indonesian National Party Attacks Communists

The central board of the Indonesian National party, which cooperated with the Communist party in the 1955 parliamentary elections, for the first time has openly attacked the Communists, an action which has been followed by an even stronger denunciation by the party's provincial branch in East Java. The National party is the largest non-Communist party in Java and the largest group represented in the cabinet.

On 27 May, the National party central board issued a press statement which, although not naming the Communists, was clearly directed against them. It accused them of "exploiting every possible opportunity as a field of agitation aimed at acquiring political ends." The East Java branch reaffirmed the central board's statement on 3 June and added that the Communist party's "dissolve-SEATO campaign" was an indication that the Communists were an instrument of a foreign power. The statement declared that the dissolution of SEATO was not an internal affair of Indonesia. It further branded the Communist party as a traitor to the goal of revolution and cited open Communist rebellion at Madiun, Central Java, in 1948, and the use of Communist-dominated village guard units in a minor insurrection in North Sumatra in October 1957. American Embassy in Djakarta comments that this is the first time an Indonesian party has been willing to state publicly that SEATO is of no concern to Indonesia.

The Communists have replaced the National party in the last two years as the largest party in Java, and the Nationalists have also largely lost the personal backing of President Sukarno. With general elections scheduled for 1959, the Nationalists face a battle for survival as a major party.



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#### Outlook for Tunisian-French Relations

Prospects for a settlement of French-Tunisian difficulties remain uncertain despite De Gaulle's note of 2 June to Bourguiba, which was notably cooler than his message to the King of Morocco and probably has not dispelled Bourguiba's gloom. The Tunisian press criticized De Gaulle's statement that he intended settling "present difficulties" for failing to specify that this settlement would include early French evacuation from Tunisia. The Tunisians apparently believe that De Gaulle's principal aim is less to renew talks than to eliminate Anglo-American good offices.

In his reply to the De Gaulle note, Bourguiba stated that Tunisia was anxious to "eliminate the major obstacles" and stressed the need for a mutually satisfactory settlement. He told the American ambassador on 2 June that he nevertheless was not optimistic about future French-Tunisian relations. He still insists on the evacuation of French troops and desires that Anglo-American good offices remain available.

On 30 May, Tunisia rejected a French proposal, said to have had De Gaulle's concurrence, for the evacuation of most of the 9,000 French troops outside the Bizerte base and the negotiation before 1 July of an agreement on Bizerte. The Tunisians suggested instead that the timetable for evacuation be reduced to two months and cover all forces, including those at Bizerte, and the evacuation of radar outposts. They stipulated that there be no connection between the negotiation of a provisional solution for Bizerte and the evacuation timetable, and asked for a Tunisian observer at They rejected the idea of neutral observers at southern airfields, but said they would reconsider this decision if Anglo-American good offices were continued and the neutral observers reported to the American and British embassies in Tunis in accordance with the 15 March good offices proposals.

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#### III. THE WEST

#### France

General de Gaulle is making a major effort to reassure France's allies, particularly the United States, that he intends to respect the NATO alliance.

He is reported to have asked Socialist Minister of State Guy Mollet to advise on foreign relations, "in particular relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries," and to have assigned Etienne Manach, a diplomat well and favorably known to the US Embassy, as Mollet's assistant on matters which "would largely involve Americans." General Paul Ely's reappointment as chief of staff, though primarily a move toward healing the break between the government and the French Army, is also reassuring at the military level of the alliance in view of Ely's firmly pro-NATO position. According to an aide, De Gaulle hopes to visit all the NATO members in the autumn.

President Coty's chief civil adviser, who claims to have conducted the preinvestiture soundings of De Gaulle's views on NATO on behalf of political party leaders, is optimistic that France will be a "solid though probably difficult" ally in NATO.

Some of the difficulties which can be expected include De Gaulle's known desire for a greater French role in military planning. The appointment to the cabinet and presumably to a top Defense Ministry post of Pierre Guillaumat, administrator general of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat, indicates De Gaulle's probable intention to expedite France's already well-advanced program to develop its own nuclear weapons.

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### The Italian Political and Economic Situation

Italy's Democratic Socialists in their newspaper La Giustizia on 3 June dashed any Christian Democratic hopes for a coalition pending clarification of the prospects for reunification with the Nenni Socialists. Continuation of the past year's minority Christian Democratic government seems almost certain since the former allies of the center coalition do not together have the seats necessary to form a majority. Such a government, according to the American Embassy, would have difficulty dealing with the serious economic problems which may face it in the next few months.

Despite the generally rapid recovery and growth of the Italian economy since the end of the war, basic problems such as paucity of natural resources, widespread unemployment, and the underdeveloped south remain. To these problems has been added a contraction in the rate of industrial expansion, which at present stems largely from internal causes such as lower public expenditures, declining housing activity, and excess industrial capacity in certain sectors. This trend may soon be accentuated by a reduction in Italy's exports and income from tourism and emigrant remittances as a result of depressed conditions in other countries.

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